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UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNCERTAINTY:
A STUDY OF THE USE OF DETAINERS
Donald E. Shelton*
When an individual has been convicted of an offense and imprisoned in
one jurisdiction, other jurisdictions having outstanding charges against the
prisoner often file what is known as a detainer or "hold order" with the
confining institution. This detainer is defined as "a warrant filed against
a person already in custody with the purpose of insuring that, after the
prisoner has completed his present term, he will be available to the author-
ity which has placed the detainer."1 On its face, it is no more than a re-
quest for information. The procedure for filing such a request is very simple.
When the prosecutor learns that the accused is being held in another
jurisdiction, he merely sends a letter or a copy of the warrant to the
warden of the prison. As a matter of "courtesy", 2 the warden will notify
the requesting agency when the release of the prisoner is imminent. This
procedure is used within a single state, between states, and between a state
and the federal government. If the prisoner is confined within the same
state, he may be arrested upon his release on the authority of the warrant
alone. The filing of a detainer itself, however, does not grant any legal
authority to detain. If the prisoner is confined in another state, the re-
questing agency must still secure a court order to obtain custody of him.
While the stated purposes and form of the detainer procedure appear
to be innocent enough, it has, in practice, led to both poor penology and
a denial of the prisoner's right to a speedy trial on the outstanding charges.
To examine the effects of the detainer procedure, the author conducted in-
terviews with officials at three prisons-State Prison of Southern Michigan
(Jackson) at Jackson, Michigan; Indiana State Prison (Indiana) at Mich-
igan City, Indiana; and the Federal Correctional Institution (Milan) at
Milan, Michigan. 3
The number of prisoners with detainers filed against them is extremely
*Mr. Shelton is a member of the Staff of Prospectus.
1 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON DETAINERs, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE
CRIME CONTROL (The Council of State Governments, 1949) at 85.
2 Hincks, The Need for Comity in Criminal Administration, FED. PROBATION, July-
Sept. 1945, at 3.
3 At Jackson, interviews were conducted with Deputy Warden Perry Johnson and
Mr. J. Wilkins (Parole Camp Supervisor). At Milan, Warden Paul Sartwell,
Mr. J. C. Everett (Advisory Assistant, Record Office), and Mr. E. M. Cage
(Parole Officer) were extremely cooperative. At Indiana, Warden Ward Lane
was interviewed. These officials expressed opinions based upon their personal
experience with the detainer procedure and did not purport to represent the
official position of the prison systems. Unless otherwise noted, the estimates
contained herein are based upon those opinions.
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high. Estimates range from twelve to twenty percent in state prisons to
thirty percent in federal penitentiaries. 4 Many of these prisoners have more
than one detainer filed against them. The outstanding charges range from
traffic offenses to murder. But the number of detainers filed is a deceiving
figure. Under the present system in most states, the filing of a detainer
does not bind the requesting agency in any way. It may or may not
prosecute the prisoner when he is released. After the prison notifies the
agency of the imminent release of the prisoner, the prosecutor will decide
whether he will take the man into custody or not. The prisoner will not
learn if he is really free or not until the time of his release. Often the
prosecutor never shows up. It is estimated that less than half of the filed
detainers are ever exercised or even filed with any intention of being
exercised.
The question is why a prosecutor would go through the motions of
asking a warden to notify him of the availability of a prisoner that he
never intends to take into custody. The first answer is that it is common
practice for many prosecutors to automatically file a detainer upon learning
that an accused is imprisoned elsewhere. This decision is made without
any regard to their eventual decision to prosecute. But the more basic
answer, and the reason why this practice of automatic filing of detainers
has developed, lies in the effects a detainer has upon the prisoner.
Prison Inequities
In many states, a detainer prisoner is automatically ineligible for
parole. 5 This ineligibility is usually not statutory but rather is the result
of the policy of state parole boards. The net effect is that detainer prisoners
who are otherwise good parole risks may spend three or more times as
long in prison as they would if a detainer had not been filed. In states
where a system of indeterminate sentencing has been adopted, prisoners
are normally eligible for parole at any time after the minimum term. But
many state parole eligibility statutes are patterned after the federal re-
quirement that a prisoner complete one-third of his term. In both situa-
tions, a parole board policy of disqualifying prisoners solely on the basis
of a detainer stultifies the legislative scheme. Merely by the allegation of
an offense the prosecutor has in effect tried, convicted, and sentenced the
defendant to additional time in prison. The extreme case is not difficult to
imagine. For example, John Doe was convicted in state X of armed
robbery and sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Under the laws of that
state, he was eligible for parole after five years. But a prosecutor in state Y
had a warrant against Doe for reckless driving and filed a detainer with
4 Bennett, The Last Full Ounce, FED. PROBATION, June 1959, at 20-21.
5 Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, FED. PROBATION, July-
Sept. 1945 p. 8, at 9-10. See also Heyns, The Detainer in a State Correctional
System, FED. PROBATION, July-Sept. 1945, at 14.
6 18 U.S.C. §4202 (1964).
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the warden. Doe, who was otherwise a good parole risk, became ineligible
for parole and spent an additional ten years in prison. At the end of his
term, the prosecutor in state Y took Doe into custody. A court found him
guilty of reckless driving and sentenced him to thirty days in jail.
Variations of parole ineligibility are equally effective. In Indiana, the
policy of the parole board is to grant only "custody" paroles to detainer
prisoners. This is not parole at all. If the prisoner is eligible in other
respects, he is granted a parole conditioned upon the filing agency's
exercise of its detainer. The agency is notified that the prisoner is about
to be released on parole. But if the agency does not secure a court order
and does not show up to apprehend the prisoner, he is never released.
The detainer is unaffected. It continues to be in effect until the completion
of the prisoner's sentence.
Other parole boards, however, allow ordinary parole to detainer pris-
oners. This is normal parole in the sense that it is not conditioned upon
any action by the filing agency. The rationale of such a policy starts from
the idea that once a man has been successfully rehabilitated, it is useless
and wasteful to keep him in prison. The parole board's duty is to evaluate
the progress of his rehabilitation and return him to society when he is
prepared to do so. Even if the prisoner is actually prosecuted and con-
victed on the outstanding charges, it is better from the standpoint of
rehabilitation that he be allowed to begin his second sentence as early
as possible. In 1955, the United States Board of Parole finally recognized
the "nuisance detainer" problem and adopted a policy of granting parole
to detainer if the prisoner was considered in other respects to be a good
parole risk. 7 Since that time the Board has granted an increasing number
of paroles to detainer prisoners. In fiscal year 1966-67, a total of 729 were
granted.8 A substantial number of prisoners (at least federal prisoners) with
detainers filed against them have thus been found to be good parole risks.
Indeed, even if only one such parole had been granted, it points out the
fallacy of a system of arbitrary denials. Unless a parole board is willing
to live with the fact that it is confining some fully rehabilitated prisoners,
such a system cannot withstand analysis. Michigan grants both parole
to detainer and custody parole. However, even when ordinary parole is
granted, the detainer prisoner is treated differently. At Jackson, prisoners
ordinarily move from the prison proper to a minimum security "parole
camp" for an adjustment period prior to their actual release on parole.
Paroled detainer prisoners are never allowed this adjustment measure and
go directly from maximum security to the street. Such unequal treatment
is certainly unjustifiable from a rehabilitative standpoint. But this denial
of parole camp at Jackson is indicative of the multitude of other inequities
that face a detainer prisoner.
7 UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, ANNUAL REPORT (1959-60), at 16.
s Letter of James C. Neagles, Staff Director of U.S. Board of Parole, November 8,
1967, on file in PROSPECTUS office.
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The reason for such inequities within the prison lies in the custodial
classification of the detainer prisoner. Normally, a prisoner is classified
in maximum, medium, or minimum custody based upon the seriousness
of the crime for which he was convicted and the prison's estimate of his
mental stability. In each of the three institutions studied, the filing of a
detainer places the prisoner in a maximum custody classification. The
rationalization is that the prisoner then has more incentive to escape. The
attitude of prison officials is that their primary duty is to confine the
prisoner. Even accepting that restricted view of the objective of a cor-
rectional system, their actions are illogical. The classification of detainer
prisoners is made automatically without regard to the seriousness of the
alleged crime or the prisoner's possible change in mental stability. No
individual evaluation is made. Such an arbitrary system is based on two
fallacious assumptions. The first is either that the prisoner is guilty of the
outstanding charge or that even if he is not, the charge itself provides an
incentive to escape. The flaw in either alternative is obvious. Any assump-
tion of guilt is anathema to our entire judicial system. And an assumption
that the allegation of an offense provides an incentive to flee presumes
such a universal distrust and lack of faith in our adversary process that
individuals would rather become fugitives than stand trial on a charge
of which they are innocent. The second assumption made by prison of-
ficials is that the possibility of another term in prison so discourages the
prisoner that he is more likely to escape. Such reasoning may be sound
if the prisoner faces the possibility of a lengthy term, but when the out-
standing charge is minor, as in the reckless driving example, it is not.
It is ridiculous to assume that the possibility of thirty days in jail will lead
a man presently serving a fifteen year term to escape. The point is that
the assumptions made by officials in classifying the detainer prisoner are
not only false; they are unnecessary. Custodial classification of detainer
prisoners could and should be based upon the same individual evaluation
process that was used to determine the original classification.
The ramifications of this custodial classification are extremely important.
In each of the prisons studied, maximum security prisoners are never
allowed outside the walls. They can never become trustys. They are in-
eligible for the farms and work camps or, for that matter, any job which
requires outside activity. At Milan and Jackson the classification also
means ineligibility for both work-release and study-release programs. (In-
diana does not have such programs.) Normal prisoners are occasionally
allowed temporary "furloughs" in the event of a death in their immediate
family. Detainer prisoners, because of their classification, are even denied
this small privilege. Prior to 1967, the vocational training buildings at
Milan were outside the walls so detainer prisoners could not receive any
of the training that is so essential to rehabilitation. The situation still
exists in some federal prisons.
Such restrictions on detainer prisoners obviously impair any rehabilita-
tion planning by prison officials. The most they can do is use the inside
[Vol. 1:I1
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facilities in an attempt to adjust the prisoner to the prison routine. Prison
officials generally feel that it is useless to spend money attempting re-
habilitation of a prisoner whose only future prospects may consist of
being transferred from one prison to another.9 Even if the prison officials
could effectively plan a rehabilitation program under the present system,
the task of motivating detainer prisoners is almost insurmountable. Their
morale is understandably very low. In each of the three institutions studied,
officials felt that the filing of a detainer and the resulting ineligibilities
made the prisoners uncooperative and unable to adjust to the institutional
life. There is no incentive for good behavior since the prisoner's custody
classification is the worst it will ever be and there is little or no prospect
of an early return to society.10 From a rehabilitation aspect, the detainer
prisoner is an outcast. The man who is charged with an additional offense
is denied both normal privileges during his imprisonment and any hope
of re-entering society when he is sufficiently rehabilitated to do so. He
is naturally "filled with anxiety and apprehension and frequently does not
respond to a training program.""
The denials which cause these psychological effects are not based upon
the considered judgement of a court of law with its accompanying pro-
cedural protections. Nor are they based upon an objective and individual
analysis of the prisoner or the charges against him. The whole chain of
events began with the some times frivolous and often times thoughtless
allegation of a single prosecutor. Indeed, in many instances the prosecutor
who filed the detainer is no longer in office when the prisoner completes
his discouraging and often prolonged sentence. The new prosecutor only
learns of the case when he receives notification of the prisoner's imminent
release. One may only speculate as to what motivated the prosecutor to
file a detainer in the first place. Perhaps a motivation is not desire to
cause the multitude of inequities and ineligibilities that will result from his
action. Perhaps it is merely the thoughtlessness of office routine or the
political ins and outs of office holders that causes the filing of detainers
which are never exercised. But regardless of the motivation, the fact is
that the filing of a detainer is the beginning of a process that destroys
any and every effort to establish a modern correctional system.
The Denial Of Speedy Trial
Upon notice12 that a detainer has been filed against them, many
prisoners correspond with the filing agency in an effort to get some dis-
9 Bennett, supra note 5, at 8.
LOSee S. RUBIN, THE LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTION, Chap. 11 § § 21, 22. See also
Bates, The Detained Prisoner and His Adjustment, FED. PROBATION, July-Sept.
1945, at 16-17.
11 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITrEE ON DETAINERS, supra note 1, at 86.
12 In Jackson and Milan, formal written notice of the filing of a detainer is imme-
diately given to the prisoner. In Indiana, oral notice is given by the case workers.
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position of the charges. In the three prisons studied, officials frequently
work with the prisoner in this effort and correspond with the agency,
if the prisoner so desires. Often neither the prisoner nor the officials get
any response from the agency. Even if a response is received, the pris-
oner's chances for an immediate trial are slim. In Indiana, only two to
three percent of the detainer prisoners are ever returned for trial during
their present term. Transfers for trial are also a rarity at Milan. Under
the present system in both prisons,1 3 the prisoner remains in a state of
uncertainty until it is time for his release. He can neither get a trial nor
a dismissal. Only when he is released will he learn of the prosecutor's
intentions.
Some defendants have challenged the validity of such a system as a
denial of their right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by the state or federal
constitution. Most of the earlier cases held that the failure of an agency
to grant some disposition of the charges was not a violation of the de-
fendant's right to speedy trial when he was incarcerated on another
charge.1 4 The rationale of these cases rested on four grounds. The first was
that the speedy trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution was not made applicable to the states by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Hence, the defendant could only
rely on his rights under the state constitution. Many state constitutions
refer to the right of speedy trial as arising at the time of the indictment
or information. Thus when the detainer was filed on the basis of a com-
plaint only, the defendant had no right which could be violated. This
contention is now obsolete. In Klopler v. North Carolina,'5 the Supreme
Court held that the right to speedy trial is as fundamental as any of the
Sixth Amendment rights and is made obligatory on the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The right to speedy trial in criminal cases arises
under the federal constitution upon a formal complaint being lodged
against the defendant.16
In all detainer systems, the filing agency must bear the cost of returning
the prisoner for trial. The agencies argued that the right to a speedy trial
did not impose a duty upon them to incur such expenses. The fallacy of
13 Michigan has enacted legislation which deals with the return of detainer prisoners
for trial. The situation at Jackson under this legislation is discussed infra.
14 In re Schechtel, 103 Colo. 77, 82 P.2d 762 (1938); McCrary v. Kansas, 281 F.2d
185 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 850 (1961); State v. Larkin, 256
Minn. 314, 98 N.W.2d 70 (1959); In re Douglas, 54 Ariz. 332, 95 P.2d 560
(1939); Application of Melton, 342 P.2d 571 (Okla. Ct. of Crim.App. 1959);
Raine v. State, 143 Tenn. 168, 226 S.W. 189 (1920); Cunningham v. State,
5 Storey (Del.) 475, 188 A.2d 359 (1962); Traxler v. State, 96 Okla. Crim.
231, 251 P.2d 815 (1952).
15 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
16 Iva Ikuko Toguri D'Aguino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951) Cert.
denied 343 U.S. 935 (1952). While the court has not yet decided whether this
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right is also applicable to the states,
the tendency in all of the due process cases has been to carry over the federal
requirements full blown to the states.
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such an argument is obvious. First, it is certainly an axiom in our system
that the prosecuting agency has the responsibility of bringing the defendant
to trail. It seems too obvious to have to explain this to law enforcement
officers. As one court put it, "We will not put a price tag upon constitu-
tional rights."1 7 Secondly, if the agency seriously intends to prosecute
the defendant, the question is not whether it must bear the expense but
only when it must be borne. Even if the prisoner is forced to complete
his sentence before the requesting agency will prosecute, the agency must
still pay the expenses of returning him for trial. If the agency does not
intend to prosecute the prisoner, then there is no reason for not granting
a dismissal of the charges.
The third contention of the filing agencies was that the right of speedy
trial was not violated since the agency could not insist as a matter of right
that the prisoner be returned for trial. Under present systems, the return
of a prisoner for trial is a matter of comity between jurisdictions. i s But
this does not excuse the agency's failure to attempt to secure the prisoner's
return. If the confining jurisdiction refuses to grant the request, the agency
may have done all it can do. It is unlikely, however, that such a request
would be refused. Confining jurisdictions have commonly released pris-
oners for trial, and some have even established an orderly procedure for
their return. In each of the three institutions studied, prison officials
indicated that disposition of the detainer, either by dismissal or returning
the prisoner for trial, was beneficial to the institution. The improvement
in prisoner morale and the removal of maximum custody classification will
enable the prison to plan meaningful rehabilitation measures. In addition,
prison administrators view detainers as a burdensome clerical headache. 19
Certainly, these officials do not object to the elimination of this "busy
work".
The final argument of the agencies was that the delay was due to the
prisoner's own wrongdoing in committing the crime for which he was
imprisoned. The easiest answer to this contention is that normally it is
not the prisoner's incarceration which has caused the delay. When it is
determined that the agency could obtain the defendant's return for trial
or that it has not attempted to obtain his return, it is the agency's failure
to act that results in delay. This is not a situation where the defendant has
purposely fled the jurisdiction to avoid trial. The agency knows where
he is and knows that it may bring him back for trial whenever it so desires.
But this argument suffers from more basic defects. First, it is illogical to
allow other offenses to affect the defendant's constitutional rights with re-
gard to the charged offense. It introduces a foreign and unrelated fact into
the consideration. The rule limiting the introduction of evidence of prior
offenses is the best example of how the courts have treated such an argu-
17 State ex. rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne, 20 Wis.2d 504, 512, 123 N.W.2d 305 (1963).
is Ponzi v. Fessenden, 258 U.S. 254 (1922).
19 Bennett, supra note 5, at 9.
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ment. Secondly, the agencies' argument is based upon a limited notion of
the purpose of the speedy trial requirement. It is not only a determination
that society has an interest in seeing an end to the litigation. The speedy
trial guarantee also insures society that something is being done to redress
the wrong which was committed. It is the people versus the defendant.
It too has a right to a reasonably prompt judicial determination of wheth-
er the defendant committed the offense. Society's right to a speedy trial-
a right which the prosecutor is obligated to preserve -is more important
than quibbling over whether the defendant has, in a theoretical sense,
caused the delay.
The more recent decisions have uniformly rejected each of these argu-
ments2 0 and proceeded to consider the real question of whether the delay
was a violation of the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
When an agency commences a criminal prosecution it has a duty to com-
plete that prosecution without any unreasonable delay. The arguments of
the agencies are inadequate to make what is an unreasonable delay a
reasonable one. In the Klopler case, the Supreme Court held that the
granting of the prosecutor's motion for nolle prosequi with leave, which
allowed him to have the case restored for trial at any time in the future,
clearly denied the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Even though the de-
fendant was free to go wherever he wished, the court said:
The pendency of the indictment may subject him to public scorn
and deprive him of employment, and almost certainly will force
curtailment of his speech, associations and participation in un-
popular causes. By indefinitely prolonging this oppression, as
well as the "anxiety and concern accompanying public accusa-
tion," the criminal procedure condoned in this case by the
Supreme Court of North Carolina clearly denies the petitioner
the right to a speedy trial . 21
The consequences of the detainer procedure are certainly more prejudicial
to the defendant than those resulting from the nolle prosequi. Not only is
the defendant not able to go wherever he wishes, the parole ineligibility
in some states completely deprives him of his liberty for a prolonged pe-
riod. The other inequities which result from his arbitrary custodial classifi-
cation deny him any opportunity for rehabilitation or adjustment. The
anxiety and concern of Mr. Klopfer is minimal compared to the psycho-
logical effects of a detainer on the prisoner. All of these results are based
20 State ex. rel. Fredenberg v. Byrne, supra note 17; Commonwealth v. McGrath,
348 Mass. 748, 205 N.E.2d 710 (1965); People v. Piscitello, 7 N.Y.2d 387, 165
N.E.2d 849 (1960); State v. Patton, 76 N.J. Super. 353, 184 A.2d 655 (1962);
United States v. Maroney, 194 F. Supp. 154 (W.D.Pa. 1961); Taylor v.
United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1956); People v. Bryarly, 23 Ill.2d 313,
178 N.E.2d 326 (1961).
21Supra note 8.
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upon the allegation of an offense. This is not only poor penology; it is a
violation of commonly held notions of due process and equal protection
of the law. The actions of a prosecutor and some prison officials have
determined the prisoner's guilt and his punishment. The argument has
been made that parole and custody classification are matters of legislative
grace and as such they are privileges and not rights of the prisoner.
2 2
But even accepting this characterization, it does not follow that the legis-
lature or its agents may discriminate solely on the basis of a single prose-
cutor's allegation of what may turn out to be a traffic offense and for
which the defendant may never be prosecuted. The legislature could un-
doubtedly decide not to grant parole at all or to classify all prisoners as
maximum custody. But once it has chosen to allow parole and vary cus-
tody classifications, it cannot discriminate between prisoners solely on the
arbitrary basis of a detainer.
What sort of fair trial can the defendant look forward to if and when
one is held? If his sentence is of any length at all, he probably will not be
able to find or present any witnesses or exhibits in his behalf. Unless he is
unusually wealthy, he cannot afford to retain counsel to preserve the
evidence for the duration of his sentence. As the number of detainers on
the prisoner increases, the trial on the charge is subsequently moved far-
ther and farther from the time of the alleged offense and the probability
of unfairness in the eventual proceeding is increased. During this interval
the prosecution has full access to all of the evidence. But if the prosecutor
seriously intends to try the defendant, he too has a real interest in an
early trial. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is certainly easier when the
evidence is fresh. Obviously, prosecutors have not taken this position.
Instead, a defendant who has been confined in another state for an ex-
tended period of time is faced with the impossible task of finding some
evidence in his behalf. Any opportunity for a fair adversary proceeding is
defeated by the act of the prosecutor in filing the detainer.
Solutions
It is clear that the present system is unjust. Three uniform laws have
been proposed to alleviate the problems caused by this system. The inter-
state act, for detainers between states or between a state and the federal
government, is called "Agreement on Detainers" 2 3 and is proposed as a
compact. The act requires prison officials to inform prisoners of detainers
which are filed against them. A prisoner may then file a formal request
for trial on the outstanding charges. The confining jurisdiction agrees to
grant temporary custody to the prosecutor for the trial. If the filing juris-
22 See Walther, Detainer Warrants And The Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ. L. REV.
423 (1963).
23 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, Agreement On Detainers (1958). See HAND-




diction fails to bring the defendant to trial within 180 days after the re-
quest, the charges are dismissed with prejudice in the filing state and the
detainer is no longer valid. Provision is made for extension of this period
upon a showing of good cause in court with the defendant or his counsel
present. To date, twenty states have enacted this agreement. 24 The federal
government has not become a party to it. The other two proposals deal
with the disposition of intrastate detainers-those filed by local prosecutors
with a prison within the same state. One is the product of the Council of
State Governments 25 and the other is proposed by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 2 6 The provisions of both
proposals are similar to those of the interstate act except that the time in
which a prisoner must be brought to trial is reduced to 90 days. 2 7 Accept-
ance of these proposals has been slow. Some states already had similar
intrastate legislation before the acts were proposed and are reluctant to
change.
Such legislation is undoubtedly the first step toward a solution of the
detainer problem but it is not the complete answer. The Michigan experi-
ence with the interstate agreement has shown that it does not eliminate
inequities within the prison. The custodial classification is still automat-
ically made upon the filing of a detainer and remains in effect at least until
trial or dismissal. If the defendant is convicted on the outstanding charge
and concurrent service of sentence is not allowed, a second detainer is
filed to get custody of the prisoner when he is eventually released and the
same ineligibilities attach.
The Michigan experience with its own intrastate act also casts doubt on
the proposal's effectiveness in solving the speedy trial problems created
by detainers. The Michigan act provides for a 180 day limitation. Under
it the number of detainers on file has sharply decreased. However, local
prosecutors have succeeded in circumventing the limitation simply by not
24See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1389 (West 1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 54-186
(1958); HAWAII REV. LAWS § 250A-1 (Supp. 1965); IOWA CODE § 759A.1
(1966); MD. ANN. CODE art 27 § 616 A (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS, Special
Acts 1965 Ch. 892; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.601 (Supp. 1961); MINN. STAT.
§ 629.294 (Supp. 1967); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-1101-1 (1963); NEB.
REV. STATS. § 29.759 (1963); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606A (1959); N. J.
REV. STAT. § 2A:159A (Supp. 1958); N. Y. CODE OF CRIM. PROC. § 669b
(McKinney 1957); N. C. GEN. STATS. § 148-89 (1965); PA. STAT. TIT. 19, §
1431 (1959); R. I. SESS. LAW 1967 225A; S. C. CODE ANN. § 17-221 (Supp.
1965); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-65-4 (1967); VT. STAT. ANN. Cit. 28, § 1301
(1967); WASH. LAWS 1967 Ch. 34.
25 See note 23 supra, at 116.
26 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM
MANDATORY DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS ACT (1958).
27 The Council of State Governments' proposal does not suggest a specific limitation
but leaves it to the individual state legislature to decide what is a reasonable
time. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' proposal also provides that if
prison officials fail to notify the prisoner of a detainer within one year, the
charges are dismissed with prejudice.
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filing their detainers until shortly before the prisoner is scheduled to be
released. Thus, in addition to the ordinary problems caused by delay, the
defendant is without any notice that charges are outstanding against him.
The same type of tactic is possible under any of the proposed uniform
acts.
The proposed legislation is an excellent starting point for remedying
the problems caused by the indiscriminate use of detainers. But the speedy
trial problem can only be effectively resolved if a further provision is
enacted. To prevent prosecutors from circumventing the statute by last
minute filing, the act should require jurisdictions with outstanding charges
against a prisoner to file their detainers within a statutory time after they
have notice of the imprisonment of the defendant. Failure to do so should
be adequate grounds for dismissal. Such a requirement is not unduly
harsh. It would only insure the defendant's right to a speedy trial and
force the prosecutor to perform his obligations. Furthermore, as the Michi-
gan experience indicates, the problem of prison inequities is not solved
under the proposed legislation. The only answer to this situation seems to
be reform within the prison system. Unless the rehabilitative aspect of
criminal correction is to be completely abandoned, prison officials must
adopt a reasonable program of parole eligibility and custodial classification
based upon the objective evaluation of the prisoner and not upon the whim
of a distant prosecuting attorney.
Detainers
